Such an interesting and relevant point to address Max. Having no accountability came up in my conversation with Joel Salatin on Food Security . How for example the ‘soy’ farmers get compensated by the US Government if their crop fails or if no one wants it. There is no consequence to their bad planning and choice , unlike for small farmers who have no end of consequences if things go wrong.
Joel Salatin is brilliant. He's one of the most interesting people working today and gets so much of these issues, especially in his industry. He's just a whole new level of innovator in his space.
Here's a one=paragraph synthesis of your excellent article:
Borders’s accountability-loop framework gives one a structural lens for diagnosing institutional failure: modern governance is dominated by “accountability voids,” positions where decision-makers wield power without ever feeling the consequences of their errors, while healthy systems require tight feedback loops in which responsibility, incentives, and outcomes converge on the same agent. The core pathology of contemporary institutions — bureaucratic insulation, technocratic impunity, and the principal-agent gap — is simply the absence of these loops. Reforms that restore contingent tenure, direct feedback, and meaningful exit options are not cosmetic tweaks but foundational repairs to the incentive architecture of society.
MB - Nice work. The greater the distance, the greater the abstraction, the less feedback a person in power gets. A one-world government would not be responsive to individuals. If someone lives in the community that they make decisions for, there is a much better chance that they will receive prompt, useful feedback. Also, their bonds with their neighbors are their skin in the game. The governance model of China is much more distributed than the the governance model of the USA. Chinese mayors can overrule the national government in important ways. The standard of living in China has improved while the standard of living in the USA has declined. I'm not saying "China good, USA bad". I'm saying "centrallized governance bad, distributed governance less bad
There are advantages to the Chinese system, for sure. But we should take care. Not only are the provincial governors pretty corrupt, but they're broke, in debt, and heavily dependent on the national government. So there might be some advantages to the distributed nature of the Chinese system, but it's easy to overestimate them.
Well done Max. And one of the interesting dimensions to ensuring a feedback loop around government proposals is its orthogonality to the left/right collectivistic/individualist spectrum. i.e the collectivist and the individualist can find common ground around a feedback loop that drives service quality up and costs down.
"Identify the dynamics that keep entrepreneurs, workers, and business owners honest—the direct feedback, the binding commitments, the contingent tenure, the enduring possibility of exit—and import those dynamics into the domains currently run by bureaucrats, managers, academics, media figures, and institutional elites."
Let's not forget to mention that drastically reducing the number of people employed by the government is an essential part of restoring the nation to health. Any remaining should have "skin in the game" as you propose.
One thing that comes to mind is to be able to sue a politician who promises one thing before election, then turns a 180 once in office. Bureaucrats are more difficult, perhaps, a good reason for getting rid of most or all of them.
I mean, yeah, I would join you in getting rid of ALL bureaucrats and politicians if we could. But they are a powerful bloc that benefits without being accountable, which is the problem. The question behind this article is really, *How do we oblige all to be accountable when, currently, they are not?*, which goes back to Madison and Montesquieu, at least, if not to the ancients. The only thing I can think of is: a people with a revolutionary instinct. But we currently have too few of the means -- and we would have to solve a giant collective action problem. Sadly, the average American just wants security and comfort. And they just keep voting for anyone who promises them that.
This is how our captains of industry and leaders in government sold America out to its economic, military and ideological competitors. They never believed it was a good idea to outsource our industrial base. It was done for money under the table, knowing they would not be held accountable.
Buckminster Fuller once proposed, at the height of the cold war, that the USSR and the USA each generate the electricity used by the other nation. It is the same idea as requiring factories to take their water input from downstream the factory. Such requirements instantly sharpen the attention.
Such an interesting and relevant point to address Max. Having no accountability came up in my conversation with Joel Salatin on Food Security . How for example the ‘soy’ farmers get compensated by the US Government if their crop fails or if no one wants it. There is no consequence to their bad planning and choice , unlike for small farmers who have no end of consequences if things go wrong.
Joel Salatin is brilliant. He's one of the most interesting people working today and gets so much of these issues, especially in his industry. He's just a whole new level of innovator in his space.
Agree and he was great to talk to, so clear and passionate about farming and healthy food. He is coming back to BOOK CHAT when his new book comes out.
Here's a one=paragraph synthesis of your excellent article:
Borders’s accountability-loop framework gives one a structural lens for diagnosing institutional failure: modern governance is dominated by “accountability voids,” positions where decision-makers wield power without ever feeling the consequences of their errors, while healthy systems require tight feedback loops in which responsibility, incentives, and outcomes converge on the same agent. The core pathology of contemporary institutions — bureaucratic insulation, technocratic impunity, and the principal-agent gap — is simply the absence of these loops. Reforms that restore contingent tenure, direct feedback, and meaningful exit options are not cosmetic tweaks but foundational repairs to the incentive architecture of society.
MB - Nice work. The greater the distance, the greater the abstraction, the less feedback a person in power gets. A one-world government would not be responsive to individuals. If someone lives in the community that they make decisions for, there is a much better chance that they will receive prompt, useful feedback. Also, their bonds with their neighbors are their skin in the game. The governance model of China is much more distributed than the the governance model of the USA. Chinese mayors can overrule the national government in important ways. The standard of living in China has improved while the standard of living in the USA has declined. I'm not saying "China good, USA bad". I'm saying "centrallized governance bad, distributed governance less bad
There are advantages to the Chinese system, for sure. But we should take care. Not only are the provincial governors pretty corrupt, but they're broke, in debt, and heavily dependent on the national government. So there might be some advantages to the distributed nature of the Chinese system, but it's easy to overestimate them.
Well done Max. And one of the interesting dimensions to ensuring a feedback loop around government proposals is its orthogonality to the left/right collectivistic/individualist spectrum. i.e the collectivist and the individualist can find common ground around a feedback loop that drives service quality up and costs down.
Absolutely. I had a friend who suggested the creation of some sort of bond that people could invest in based on performance, whatever the sector.
Excellent analysis. One comment:
"Identify the dynamics that keep entrepreneurs, workers, and business owners honest—the direct feedback, the binding commitments, the contingent tenure, the enduring possibility of exit—and import those dynamics into the domains currently run by bureaucrats, managers, academics, media figures, and institutional elites."
Let's not forget to mention that drastically reducing the number of people employed by the government is an essential part of restoring the nation to health. Any remaining should have "skin in the game" as you propose.
Absolutely. And if they continue to be employed by the state, what -- besides elections and appointments -- is the loop?
One thing that comes to mind is to be able to sue a politician who promises one thing before election, then turns a 180 once in office. Bureaucrats are more difficult, perhaps, a good reason for getting rid of most or all of them.
I mean, yeah, I would join you in getting rid of ALL bureaucrats and politicians if we could. But they are a powerful bloc that benefits without being accountable, which is the problem. The question behind this article is really, *How do we oblige all to be accountable when, currently, they are not?*, which goes back to Madison and Montesquieu, at least, if not to the ancients. The only thing I can think of is: a people with a revolutionary instinct. But we currently have too few of the means -- and we would have to solve a giant collective action problem. Sadly, the average American just wants security and comfort. And they just keep voting for anyone who promises them that.
This is good stuff.
This is how our captains of industry and leaders in government sold America out to its economic, military and ideological competitors. They never believed it was a good idea to outsource our industrial base. It was done for money under the table, knowing they would not be held accountable.
Buckminster Fuller once proposed, at the height of the cold war, that the USSR and the USA each generate the electricity used by the other nation. It is the same idea as requiring factories to take their water input from downstream the factory. Such requirements instantly sharpen the attention.