The Great and Terrible Illusion
Max More, founder of Extropianism, argues that there is really no such thing as the State. Here we explore More's "Deep Anarchy," which is coming up on its 35th anniversary.
The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people. —Benito Mussolini
Is the State an illusion? Philosopher and founding Extropian Max More thinks so. More’s classic essay “Deep Anarchy” is a philosophical exploration of the concept of state eliminativism. Similarities with physical theories of eliminative materialism (eliminativism in the philosophy of mind) struck me immediately upon reading this seminal essay.
Eliminative materialists argue there is no distinct mental stuff, only physical stuff such as agglomerations of neurons, neural firings, and so on, configured in feedback loops that create illusions—the totality of which we call “mind.” Metaphysically speaking, though, there are only physical entities with physical properties. At least that is basically the eliminativist position.
What, if anything, does that have to do with state eliminativism?
The Functional Integrity Thesis
More thinks we already live in anarchy because the concept of a "State" as an entity is probably illusory. That doesn’t mean you won’t be audited or tossed in jail for smoking a joint. But More suggests anarchist activists misinterpret the nature of the State, which leads them to engage in counterproductive strategies such as joining political parties in hopes of disrupting the system from within.
More then delves into ontology—the nature of existence—particularly in the context of complex objects and entities. He uses the term "Functional Integrity Thesis" (FIT) to explain that the existence of some entity is determined by the degree of functional integrity within the collection of its parts. Here’s More:
Imagine that I have a bag of marbles, each of which we grant is an object. I scatter the marbles on the floor randomly. Now it is quite possible for me to refer to the collection of marbles as a whole rather than to each of the individual marbles. If I’m eccentric I might even give the collection a name such as “Gertrude.” By using the name Gertrude I can then simply refer to the collection of marbles without having to point to or mention any of the marbles individually. Does this mean that we should say Gertrude exists, or that Gertrude is an individual, an object?
By contrast, More thinks you might have different ideas about an eagle.
An eagle is a thing, an object, even though it is composed of many parts such as limbs, organs, feathers, and so on. These parts can be further broken down into sub-parts such as cells, and further into organelles, molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles (or fields).
In the eagle example, its existence as an object is affirmed because the eagle's parts (limbs, organs, feathers) have a high degree of functional integrity. That is to say, the eagle is a coherent entity, not merely because its limbs, organs, etc. are contiguous. They also interrelate causally in ways that make the eagle something real. In the case of the bag of marbles, though, More argues these mere agglomerations should not be considered entities because they lack functional integrity.
What does this suggest about the nature of the State?
State of Hypostatization
Max More thinks the existence/non-existence of a complex entity is not binary, but is rather a continuum determined by the degree of functional integrity. The concept of "the State" might not have any real referent due to the lack of functional integrity in its agglomerations. Indeed, More suggests that the State, which is assumed to be a collection of entities such as politicians, policemen, tax collectors, and bureaucrats, fails to meet the criteria of a clearly identifiable collection of parts (people) with high functional integrity.
More dismisses the idea that a state is a monopoly on violence within a geographical area, and instead points out that the wielders of power are merely individual humans. The State, in More’s view, is but hypostatization.
More goes on to question the existence of other entities such as corporations or clubs, proposing that while these may have some functional integrity due to specific relations and agreements between persons, they do not literally think or act. Comparatively, though, More argues, a state lacks a degree of functional integrity because it also lacks contractual ties.
Do contractual ties create quasi-reality on the FIT continuum?
According to More, the only aspects of the state that provide any functional integrity are the implicit threats of violence or coercion authorities bring to bear, as well as the intersubjective fear (and/or religious zeal), which invites the masses’ perennial submission. (I would add that interest groups receive redistributed largess, which has its own incentives.)
If More is right, the State is just one great and terrible egregore, which means the fears and fantasies of statists are all that hold it together.
If you’re skeptical, consider this from writer Jamie Bartlett:
This is the crux of the problem: nation-states rely on control. If they can’t control information, crime, businesses, borders, or the money supply, then they will cease to deliver what citizens demand of them. In the end, nation-states are nothing but agreed-upon myths: we give up certain freedoms in order to secure others. But if that transaction no longer works, and we stop agreeing on the myth, it ceases to have power over us.
If More and Bartlett are right in their respective positions, it leads me to wonder: Can an ought be derived from an isn’t?
Methodological Individualism
Telescoping backward from the issue a click, Max More introduces the concept of Methodological Individualism. The idea is that only individual humans, not abstract entities like the state, can make decisions, perceive, think, and act. State actions are therefore just the sum of individual behaviors, which make everyone part of “the State’s" machinations.
In his concluding remarks, More argues we already live in a kind of anarchy. Then he asks us to consider a possibility: instead of submitting to the spectacles of macro-politics—feeding the egregore—we should focus instead on micro-politics, that is, the politics of individual behavior.
That means minimizing one's contribution to the illusion, paying no heed to unjust laws when possible, and promoting cultural change towards voluntary association and anti-authoritarianism. “Extropians,” as More refers to those who share his wider philosophy, should emphasize individual responsibility to bring about a society that is free from collectivist irrationality.
Breaking the Spell
Even if Max More is right about the illusory nature of the State, we have to admit it would be incredibly hard to break that spell.
It is rather like Jews sitting around kvetching about Christmas songs starting after Halloween. At some level, they know they’ll hear those songs every year, just as we know IRS agents will show up at our door if we fail to render unto Caesar’s protection racket.
After a while, we just shuttle along, keeping our heads down.
Is breaking the spell of the State and statism just as hard as Jews trying to oblige the masses to put the breaks on Christmas songs? In America, at least, most Jews just recite their baruch atahs, light their candles, and tolerate the carols as long as the old crooners sing them. Christmas remains a juggernaut. And “Santa” still delivers the toys, just as the State still delivers welfare, security, and justice.
Or so the story goes.
Can anti-authoritarians ever break the spell? I cannot say. My hope in publishing Underthrow is not just to disabuse people of their worship of Government as God—though that is certainly an important theme. We also want to paint pictures of possibility, of what life would be like if we, as individuals, self-organized into niches of experimentation—hopefully to discover better protocols.
You can find more Max More here.
I'm honored that you read and commented on my ancient essay. In the third-century since then, my views have changed little. If I were to write that piece today, I would add something about public choice economics and other analytical approaches to understanding the emergent motivations of parts of "the state".
BTW, N. Dexia is engaged in a series on alternative governance/social organization approaches. I recently pointed him to your work and that of Tom W. Bell. https://ndexia.substack.com/
Small erratum: where you say 'deontology' I believe you mean 'ontology'.
While I'm sympathetic to the goals here, the methods don't appeal to me greatly... I have too much sympathy for the bag of marbles, I suppose. It is never as straightforward as this makes it sound to slice up ontology into legitimate and illegitimate entities. In this regard I'm partial to Stephen Yablo's fictionalist retort to Quine, but I don't suppose that kind of approach would satisfy you, Max.
Stay wonderful!