I wonder if I'm missing something ... because the Global Insurance Fund sounds like pure globalism. It's the UN, WEF, World Bank. Private insurance markets provide efficiency and serve the cause of freedom and peaceful resolutions, due to the competition and decentralization of the market. How does globalism-controlled insurance -- or nationalism-controlled insurance -- provide better incentives than the might-makes-right that government already provides?
Donning my ancap hat for a moment… I think that private defense agencies would slide into a lot of these notions quite easily. Indeed, I suspect they would have even more initial incentives to do so.
I wondered about this as I wrote. Imagine Ancapistan among states, some of which are hostile. Does the game theory work to keep Ancapistan's peace incentives? I think it does, but it's difficult to say. I think a more statist critic of this might say that the prevention incentives make a country (say the US) more vulnerable. I don't know, but I suspect there are some tradeoffs involved. I know that hostile imperial states helped turn the US into a hostile imperial state to *win* WWII and maintain global supremacy. I know this stuff ain't easy, so I want to be extremely tentative with ideas like this.
Such humility is of course wise and reasonable given the unknowns involved.
Questions like these come up frequently in discussions with everyone from statists to the anarcho-curious, so I think about it a fair amount—though the focus on peace incentives adds some new angles.
One thing that comes up a lot (when defending the notion that Ancapistan is viable) is the existence of small states. In the current context, small states are as defenseless as Ancapistan is presumed to be (it would not be defenseless at all, but that is a separate issue). So, we say, why don't large states just swallow up every small state?
The statist response is often something to do with the Pax Americana, and while I think that is a partial explanation at best (and certainly does not cover every state that exists now, or has ever existed), let's go with it.
If we envision a world with all states, save for one Ancapistan, then why can't a version of the Pax Americana (or the protection offered to, say, Andorra by her neighbors) apply to Ancapistan? What's good for the goose is good for the gander, right? If we presume that certain incentives can exist for large states not to attack small states, then we can at least posit that similar incentives might exist for Ancapistan.
Hoppe and others have pointed out, quite persuasively, that small states do have a number of incentives that might be considered under the rubric of peace incentives. They have to have lower taxes, and more freedom, to attract investment and prevent brain drain. They have to provide a more favorable business climate. They are wise to do things like provide a service few others do (like special bank accounts in Switzerland or the Caymans). And of course they must be neutral (or attach themselves to a large state like a remora on a shark).
Ancapistan, presumably, could take similar steps and enjoy an analogous standing: filling a role that makes it such that the incentives to leave it alone (and the disincentives to attacking) are high.
> Inspired by a more strategic, anticipatory approach—let’s say the government pivots to a peacebuilding model, one we’ll tongue-in-cheekily refer to as Mercenaries for Peace. Instead of rewarding its military and diplomatic corps with lavish budgets, which go to bureaucracy building and no-bid contracts, it restructures incentives to prevent conflicts before they ignite.
That's the model we've been theoretically following since WWII. That you can't even recognize it as such should tell you how it tended to work out in practice.
Fun to think about, but like the war on drugs the truly difficulty lies in the demand for the product. Too many people are addicted to fighting and others who profit from war. To give just one example, politicians rake in millions just in campaign contributions ($30+ million from pro-Israel contributors just in the 2024 election campaign) winners and losers to keep the Billions flowing in military aid to Israel. Plus the cash payments from lobbyists year in year out. That's not generosity; it's bribery. Where are the billions in support for peace?
I wonder if I'm missing something ... because the Global Insurance Fund sounds like pure globalism. It's the UN, WEF, World Bank. Private insurance markets provide efficiency and serve the cause of freedom and peaceful resolutions, due to the competition and decentralization of the market. How does globalism-controlled insurance -- or nationalism-controlled insurance -- provide better incentives than the might-makes-right that government already provides?
I dunno. I'm thinking more like a Lloyds of London model. But I'm not an expert here.
And I don't know much about Lloyd's of London! 😅
It is.
OK, so I'm not the only one who had this question . . . thanks.
Very creative ideas!
Donning my ancap hat for a moment… I think that private defense agencies would slide into a lot of these notions quite easily. Indeed, I suspect they would have even more initial incentives to do so.
I wondered about this as I wrote. Imagine Ancapistan among states, some of which are hostile. Does the game theory work to keep Ancapistan's peace incentives? I think it does, but it's difficult to say. I think a more statist critic of this might say that the prevention incentives make a country (say the US) more vulnerable. I don't know, but I suspect there are some tradeoffs involved. I know that hostile imperial states helped turn the US into a hostile imperial state to *win* WWII and maintain global supremacy. I know this stuff ain't easy, so I want to be extremely tentative with ideas like this.
Such humility is of course wise and reasonable given the unknowns involved.
Questions like these come up frequently in discussions with everyone from statists to the anarcho-curious, so I think about it a fair amount—though the focus on peace incentives adds some new angles.
One thing that comes up a lot (when defending the notion that Ancapistan is viable) is the existence of small states. In the current context, small states are as defenseless as Ancapistan is presumed to be (it would not be defenseless at all, but that is a separate issue). So, we say, why don't large states just swallow up every small state?
The statist response is often something to do with the Pax Americana, and while I think that is a partial explanation at best (and certainly does not cover every state that exists now, or has ever existed), let's go with it.
If we envision a world with all states, save for one Ancapistan, then why can't a version of the Pax Americana (or the protection offered to, say, Andorra by her neighbors) apply to Ancapistan? What's good for the goose is good for the gander, right? If we presume that certain incentives can exist for large states not to attack small states, then we can at least posit that similar incentives might exist for Ancapistan.
Hoppe and others have pointed out, quite persuasively, that small states do have a number of incentives that might be considered under the rubric of peace incentives. They have to have lower taxes, and more freedom, to attract investment and prevent brain drain. They have to provide a more favorable business climate. They are wise to do things like provide a service few others do (like special bank accounts in Switzerland or the Caymans). And of course they must be neutral (or attach themselves to a large state like a remora on a shark).
Ancapistan, presumably, could take similar steps and enjoy an analogous standing: filling a role that makes it such that the incentives to leave it alone (and the disincentives to attacking) are high.
Or so the theory goes!
> Inspired by a more strategic, anticipatory approach—let’s say the government pivots to a peacebuilding model, one we’ll tongue-in-cheekily refer to as Mercenaries for Peace. Instead of rewarding its military and diplomatic corps with lavish budgets, which go to bureaucracy building and no-bid contracts, it restructures incentives to prevent conflicts before they ignite.
That's the model we've been theoretically following since WWII. That you can't even recognize it as such should tell you how it tended to work out in practice.
Fun to think about, but like the war on drugs the truly difficulty lies in the demand for the product. Too many people are addicted to fighting and others who profit from war. To give just one example, politicians rake in millions just in campaign contributions ($30+ million from pro-Israel contributors just in the 2024 election campaign) winners and losers to keep the Billions flowing in military aid to Israel. Plus the cash payments from lobbyists year in year out. That's not generosity; it's bribery. Where are the billions in support for peace?